In this paper, we study the relation of related-tweak/key impossible differentials with singlekey ones. Following a heuristic strategy, we can derive longer related-tweak/key impossible differentials from single-key ones. We implement this strategy with the MILP technique and apply it to search relatedtweak/key impossible differentials of two tweakable block ciphers: QARMA-64 and Joltik-BC-128. For QARMA-64, we find several 7-round related-tweak impossible differential distinguishers and use them to mount a 10-round key recovery attack including the outer whitening key; for Joltik-BC-128, we find two 6-round related-tweakey impossible differential distinguishers and use them attack 9-round and 10-round Joltik-BC-128 respectively. INDEX TERMS Impossible differential attack, Joltik-BC-128, QARMA-64, related-tweakey, tweakable block cipher.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, a lot of block ciphers have been proposed. A key point for these ciphers to be accepted and used by industry is to provide a reliable security evaluation. Recently, cryptanalysts find many classical cryptanalysis methods could be converted to mathematical optimization problems which aim to achieve the minimal or maximal value of an objective function under certain constraints. Mixedinteger Linear Programming (MILP) is the most widely studied technique to solve these optimization problems. One of the most successful applications of MILP is to search differential and linear trails. Mouha et al. [1] first applied MILP method to count active Sboxes of word-based block ciphers. Then, at Asiacrypt 2014, Sun et al. [2] extended this technique to search differential and linear trails, whose key idea is to derive some linear inequalities through the H-Representation of the convex hull of all differential patterns of S-box. Sun et al. also provided a greedy algorithm to select a certain number of linear inequalities from hundreds of linear inequalities produced by SageMath [3] . Based on H-Representation of the convex hull of S-box and Sun's greedy algorithm, Xiang et al. [4] introduced a MILP model to search integral distinguisher, Sasaki and Todo [5] and
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Cui et al. [6] gave the MILP-based impossible differential search model independently. There are many more MILPbased tools proposed recently, such as MILP-based differential/linear search model for ARX ciphers [7] , MILP-based conditional cube attacks [8] , [9] on Keccak [10] , etc. Since MILP-based automated evaluation tools could help to evaluate various complicated designs in the short term, it is being explored intensively by worldwide researchers. In the aspect of searching impossible differential, Sasaki et al. [5] 's MILP model could not cover the search of related-key/tweakey impossible differential. Cui et al. [6] studied a special case of related-key impossible differential of LBlock. However, it is not a general model and could not be applied to other ciphers trivially. In all, to find the related-key/tweakey impossible differentials using MILP-based method is worth further studying.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we propose an interesting strategy that can derive longer related-tweak/key impossible differentials from single-key ones. The strategy is heavily reliant on the key schedule. With the MILP technique, we convert this strategy to a MILP modeling process and make it into an automatic tool for searching related-tweak/key impossible differentials. We successfully apply this tool to QARMA-64 and Joltik-BC-128. For QARMA-64, we find several 7-round related- VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ tweak impossible differential distinguishers and use them to mount a 10-round key recovery attack; for Joltik-BC-128, we give two 6-round related-tweakey impossible differential distinguishers and attack its 9-round and 10-round version.
B. RELATED WORK
In [11] , the authors give a meet-in-the-middle attack on 9-round QARMA-64 under the single-key setting. Till now, the best cryptanalysis result on QARMA-64 is a 10-round related-tweak statistical saturation attack [12] , with a data complexity of 2 59 and a time complexity of 2 59 using 8 tweaks, while the attack in this paper needs 2 tweaks. For Joltik-BC-128, there are two related cryptanalysis results.
In [13] , the authors propose a meet-in-the-middle attack on 10-round Joltik-BC-128 with a data complexity of 2 56.1 , a time complexity of 2 126.5 under the single-key setting.
In [14] , they attack 9-round Joltik-BC-128 with a data complexity of 2 53 , a time complexity of 2 56.6 , a memory complexity of 2 52.91 blocks and 10-round Joltik-BC-128 with a data complexity of 2 53 , a time complexity of 2 101.4 and a memory complexity of 2 76.91 blocks, using the related-key meet-inthe-middle methodology. The related work and our results are shown in Table 1 . We point that all of related results in Table 1 are later than the original version of our work in [15] .
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we give a detailed description of how to derive longer related-tweak/key impossible differentials using our strategy. In Section III, we introduce the 7-round relatedtweak impossible differential of QARMA-64 and attack its 10-round version. In Section IV, we introduce two 6-round related-tweakey impossible differentials and attack its 9-round and 10-round version. In Section V, we conclude this paper.
II. MILP MODEL TO SEARCH RELATED-KEY IMPOSSIBLE DIFFERENTIAL
In 2014 [16] , the TWEAKEY framework with the goal to unify the design of tweakable block ciphers and of block ciphers resistant to related-key attacks was proposed.
Since then, many proposals, for example, Deoxys-BC [17] , Joltik-BC [18] , SKINNY [19] and QARMA [20] , have followed the TWEAKEY framework and thus take a unified tweakey input instead of a pair key/tweak. For these proposals, many works [14] , [21] - [23] have shown the risky of the related-tweakey setting. There are two reasons: 1) One original feature of a tweakable block cipher is that the extra cost of making a block cipher tweakable is small. To satisfy this requirement, many tweakable block ciphers adopt a very simple (fully linearity) tweakey schedule. The attacker can utilize the tweakey schedule to mount a related-key attack efficiently; 2) What's more, the tweak part can be public, thus it can be totally controlled by the attacker. Obtaining a specific tweakey differential is easier, for example, we can just get all nonzero difference from the tweak part and set the difference of the key part to zero. Considering the popular future that more tweakable block ciphers will adopt the TWEAKEY framework, the relatedtweakey analysis result will be a significant evaluation criteria for these ciphers.
This section introduces a method that can automatically derive longer related-key impossible differentials from single-key impossible differentials. We use ''related-key'' to represent ''related-key'' and ''related-tweakey'' as the method can be applied to both block ciphers and tweakable block ciphers. General idea of this method is that by importing tweak/key differences that are equal to the input and output difference of the original single-key impossible differential, check whether the tweak/key differential and the related-key impossible differential still holds. In order to describe this idea more concretely, we introduce the following notations. Figure 1 shows a framework to construct a new related tweak/key impossible differential from a r-round singlekey impossible differential. We summarise the procedures in Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, there are three MILP models to be solved, i.e., M 1 , M 2 and M 3 .
• In step 1-6, we follow the ideas to find single-key impossible differential from Sasaki and Todo [5] and Cui et al. [6] . If M 1 is infeasible, an r-round single-key impossible differential is found with input and output differences ( i = x, i+r = y).
• In step 7-9, a MILP model M 2 is constructed to test whether the r -round tweak/key differential of the cipher's key schedule is valid with k i = x and k i+r = y. We are going to use the tweak/key differences to introduce the input and output differences of the r-round cipher. If M 2 is feasible, that means there is no contradiction in the tweak/key differential of the r -round key/tweak Schedule. If M 2 is infeasible, that means there is not any tweak/key pair that satisfy k i = x and k i+r = y. For linear tweakey schedule, such as Joltik-BC, QARMA, given x and y:
-If the tweakey size is n (equals to the block size), one of the two conditions k i = x and k i+r = y is satisfied, thus we could only extend the trail in one direction, and r + 1-round relatedtweakey impossible differential is expected to find.
-If the tweakey size is 2n, it is expected that there is only one tweakey differential characteristic, whose probability is 1, that satisfy k i = x and k i+r = y on average. Thus an r + 2-round related-tweakey impossible differential is expected to find.
-If the tweakey size is 3n, not only the two conditions k i = x and k i+r = y could be satisfied, but also one of k i−1 = 0 and k i+r+1 = 0 conditions could be satisfied in step 17. Thus we could extend one more round to get an r + 3-round related-tweakey impossible differential. For nonlinear tweakey schedules, we have more freedom. Since an input key difference of an S-boxes will get many more possible output differences, that means if we fixed the above two constrains in the input and output sides, there will be a key differential characteristic on average with certain probability smaller than 1. And M 2 will output the feasible solution. However, it is more like a weak-key setting, that the valid keys must belongs to a given very small subset of the full key space. In this paper, we only focus on linear key schedules.
• In step 10-13, M 3 is constructed and solved.
-If M 3 is feasible, that means the added tweak/key differences to the r-round single-key differential model M 2 makes it feasible. Thus the r -round related tweak/key differential is possible. item If M 3 is infeasible, we get a r -round related tweak/key impossible differential.
• In step 14-18, we extend the r -round related tweak/key impossible differential to r + 2 rounds or more.
III. THE APPLICATION TO QARMA BLOCK CIPHER
QARMA is a lightweight tweakable block cipher recently accepted by FSE 2017 which has been used by the ARMv8 architecture to support a software protection feature.
It contains two versions: QARMA-64 and QARMA-128.
In this paper, we focus on QARMA-64. QARMA-64 is a SPN structure with 14 rounds and the central construction (two-round functions and a Pseudo-Reflector construction). The encryption process can be seen as a sequence of operations on the 64-bit internal state together with a tweak and the key. QARMA-64 claims a 128-bit trade-off security.
For QARMA-64, a plaintext P can be expressed as: [4] p [5] p [6] p [7] p [8] p [9] p [10] p [11] p [12] p [13] p [14] p [15]    
The forward round function F includes 4 operations:
KeyAddition(K): The i th 64-bit round key K i is XORed to the state S with the round tweak T i and round constant c i .
ShuffleCell(τ ):
This operation is a simple cell permutation, i.e., S 0,1,2,3,4,5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 → S 0,11,6,13,10,1,12,7,5,14,3,8,15,4,9,2 .
MixColumn(M):
Each column of the cipher internal state array is multiplied by an involutory matrix M . All possible transitions of M is depicted in Figure 8 in Appendix A-A.
The multiplication of an element of the array with ρ i is just a simple left circular rotation of the element by i bits.
SubCell(S):
Apply the non-linear 4 × 4 Sbox in parallel on each nibble of the state. The designer propose three kinds of Sbox shown in Table 3 in Appendix A-B.
The backward round function is the inverse of the forward round function. Notice that a short version of the forward round function exists in the first forward round and the last backward round which omits the ShuffleCell and MixColumn operation.
The central construction is made up of one forward round, one backward round and a Pseudo-Reflector constructions. The Pseudo-Reflector construction includes four parts which is essentially a ShuffleCell-MixColumn-KeyAddition-Inverse ShuffleCell operation.
For convenience, we use T j i to denote the j th nibble of the tweak state inside the i th round, similarly, for the cipher internal state:
Algorithm 1 Related-Key Impossible Differential Searching Algorithm Based on MILP Technique
Input: Block cipher E, i and r Output: Related-tweak/key impossible differential 1 for All differences x do 2 for All differences y do 3 Construct MILP model M 1 describing the differential behaviour of the r-round cipher shown in Figure 1 in the single-key setting; Return (r + 2)-round related tweak/key impossible differential with input and output differences
The Tweak (T) Update Function
There are two operations for the tweak during every round: W and H. The H operation is a nibble permutation: H = [6, 5, 14, 15, 0, 1, 2, 3, 7, 12, 13, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11] ; the W operation is essentially a LFSR that updated the 4-bit tweak cells from (b3, b2, b1, b0) to (b0⊕b1, b3, b2, b1) with indexes (0, 1, 3, 4, 8, 11, 13). 
The Key Schedule
In the attack on QARMA-64 of this paper, all used round keys(K 5, 6, 13, 14, 15 ) are the same value. They are decided by the same 64 bits of the master key. For more information about the key schedule, we refer to [20] .
A. A 7-ROUND RELATED-TWEAK IMPOSSIBLE DISTINGUISHER FOR QARMA-64
As shown in Figure 2 , we first get a 5-round (including a Pseudo-Reflector) single-key impossible distinguisher highlighted in the broken blue line. Following the strategy in Section II, we derive a new 7-round related-tweakey impossible distinguisher:
The differential from (00000000000 W 5 [11] 0000) to (000000 W 13 [6] 000000000) is impossible when the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) W 5 [11] is the only active nibble of W 5 ;
(2) T 6 [11] Proof: In the single-key setting, the 5-round (R7 − R11) differential from X 7 to Z 11 is impossible. When X 7 [15] is the only active nibble of X 7 , in the forward direction, the first column of Y 8 will be inactive, after the inverse of a τ operation, W 9 [0, 5, 10, 15] will also be inactive; in the backward direction, when X 11 [0] is the only active nibble of X 11 , after a 2.5-round decryption, Z 9 [10] is active, thus in the backward direction, W 9 [10] is active. So this is a contradiction! In the related-tweak setting:
In the forward direction, as shown in Figure 2 , when condition (1)-(3) are satisfied, according to the transition property of the ShuffleCell operation and the MixColumn operation, X 8 [0, 5, 10, 15] will be inactive nibbles. And when condition (2) is satisfied, according to the tweak update function, T 8 [15] will be an active nibble. Thus, after a KeyAddition operation, W 9 [10] is still inactive.
In the backward direction, when condition (4)-(6) are satisfied, it's easy to verify that Y 12 , Z 12 and W 12 will be all inactive. The only active nibble X 11 [0] will come from T 11 [0] . After a round function, W 11 [4, 8, 12] will be all active.
Notice that Z 11 [4] [4] , thus condition (7) will ensure that X 10 [4] is not zero as W 11 [4] 
After another two backward rounds, the active nibbles ( X 10 [4, 8, 12] , T 9 [11] ) will ensure that Y 9 [1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15] are all active nibbles and the other 6 nibbles in Y 9 are all inactive nibbles.
By now, as the contradiction is only related to Y 9 [10, 14] , we only consider the transition situation of the third column. According to the transform property of the MixColumn operation shown in Figure 8 in Appendix A-A, when Y 9 [10, 14] are the only two active nibbles in the third column of Y 9 , Z 9 [10, 14] will also be two active nibbles with probability 1.
Thus, in the backward direction, Z 9 [10] is active; after a SubCell operation, in the forward direction, W 9 [10] is inactive. This is a contradiction, thus when all 7 conditions are satisfied, the differential is impossible.
We give an example of the internal state differences conforming the distinguisher in Table 4 in Appendix A-C.
B. ATTACK ON 10-ROUND QARMA-64
Due to the trade-off security claim of QARMA-64, the distinguisher in Section III-A can not be applied directly to attack 10-round QARMA-64. We use the differential from R7 to R12 in Figure 2 as the distinguisher and mount an attack on 10-round QARMA-64 including the whitening key bits. (2) Under T , construct 2 n structures such that each structure traverse 4 nibbles: P [7, 8, 11, 13] and the other 12 nibbles are constants; under T , construct 2 n structures such that each structure satisfies that a): P [7, 8, 11, 13] [9] ). (4.a) Guess the value of K 5 [11] ⊕ w 0 [11] and encrypt the message to get the value of W 5 [11] . Eliminate the key value that don't make W 5 [11] = T 6 [11] . This is a 4-bit filter. (4.b) Guess the value of K 5 [7, 8, 13 ] ⊕ w 0 [7, 8, 13] [2] . This is a 4-bit filter. (4.d) Guess the value of K 14 [3, 6, 9] ⊕ w 1 [3, 6, 9] and decrypt the message to get the value of W 14 [3, 6, 9] . Calculate the value of Z 1 (4.e) Guess the value of ρ · K 13 [6] ⊕ ρ · K 13 [3] ⊕ ρ 2 · K 13 [9] , decrypt the message to get the value of Z 13 [6] and W 13 [6] . Only remain the key value if W 13 [6] = T 12 [6] . This step performs a 4-bit filter. Till now, we get the key values that make the message difference satisfy the input and output difference of the distinguisher. Overall, the whole process performs a 24-bit filter, we can eliminate 2 −24 of the guessed key bits with one message pair. (5) By utilizing the distinguisher in Figure 9 and the attack differential in Figure 10 in Appendix A-D, we can mount another 10-round attack which includes the following 36-bit key information: (K 5 [10] [5] ). Except for the index difference of the relevant nibbles, the attack procedure is nearly the same as the above steps. (6) Finally, we exhaustively search the remaining key information of the master key. Complexity: Due to the trade-off security claim, we do not eliminate all the wrong key values for the 36-bit information. When we choose n structures, the number of the remaining key values is 2 36 · (1 − 1 28 ) 2 n−16 , we choose n = 45, then there are about 34-bit key information remaining. In step (6), the remaining key bits includes 124-bit information. In total, the data complexity is 2 × 2 45+16 = 2 62 plaintexts. The complexity of the attack procedure is shown in Table 2 . E denotes a 10-round encryption unit from R5 to R14. The memory complexity is used to store the guessed key information, thus it is 2 × 2 36 = 2 37 bits storage. The overall complexity is 2 124 + 2 62 · 2 63 ≈ 2 125.8 .
IV. THE APPLICATION TO JOLTIK-BC BLOCK CIPHER
We first recall the details of Joltik-BC-128 block cipher. We assume that the reader is familiar with the AES block cipher. Joltik-BC is the internal ad-hoc tweakable block cipher of the Joltik authenticated encryption scheme, conforming to the TWEAKEY framework [16] . For Joltik-BC-128, the tweakey size is 128-bit; for Joltik-BC-192, the tweakey size is 192-bit. In this paper, we focus on Joltik-BC-128. Joltik-BC is an AES-like design, i.e., it is an iterative substitution-permutation network that transforms the initial plaintext through series of round functions (that depend on the key and the tweak) to a ciphertext.
To be consistent with the Joltik document, the index of the internal state is in column major order, e.g., a plaintext P can be expressed as: [4] p [8] p [12] p [1] p [5] p [9] p [13] p [2] p [6] p [10] p [14] p [3] p [7] p [11] p [15]     which is different from the index rule of the QARMA block cipher.
The number r of rounds is 24 for Joltik-BC-128. One round, similarly to a round in AES, has the following four transformations applied to the internal state. After the last round, a final AddRoundTweakey operation is performed to produce the ciphertext.
Definition of the Subtweakey: Let us denote with STK i the subtweakey (a 64-bit word) that is added to the state at round i. For Joltik-BC-128, subtweakey is defined as:
The 64-bit words TK 1 i , TK 2 i are outputs produced by a special key schedule algorithm. A single instance of this algorithm, denoted as KS(W , α), takes as inputs a 64-bit word W and a nibble α and produces subkeys TK 0 , TK 1 , · · · The subkeys are produced sequentially, one from another (where TK 0 = W ), by applying two permutations: a nibble permutation h, and a finite field multiplication g:
Let us define the inputs W and α. Denote the concatenation of the key K and the tweak T as KT , i.e., KT = K ||T . Then, in Joltik-BC-128, the size of KT is 128 bits. The first (most significant) 64 bits of KT is W 1 , while the second is W 2 . Then, TK 1 i are the output words of the key scheduling algorithm KS(W 1 , 1), and TK 2 i are the output words of the key scheduling algorithm KS(W 2 , 2).
Proposition 1: (Differential Property of Sbox, [24] ). Given the nonzero input and output differences of an Sbox, there exists only one pair of actual values on average to satisfy these two differences Proposition 2: (Subtweakey Difference Cancellation). As noticed by the designers [18] , a single subtweakey difference cancellation can happen every 15 rounds for Joltik-BC-128. Suppose that a single cell of TK 1 and TK 2 are active. Let a1 and a2 be differences of the active cells respectively. Then the subtweakey difference of the first round is a2 ⊕ a1 at this cell, and in the i-th round, the subtweakey difference is KS i (a2, 2)⊕a1 ignoring the position permutation h. Since a1 and a2 are both nonzero differences, KS i (a2, 2) ⊕ a1 = 0 can happen no more than one time.
A. A 6-ROUND RELATED-TWEAKEY IMPOSSIBLE DISTINGUISHER
Apply Algorithm 1 to Joltik-BC-128, we get a 6-round related-tweak impossible distinguisher as shown in Figure 4 . Similarly, we will explain the distinguisher in a miss-in-themiddle method.
Distinguisher:
It is easy to verify that the differential from X 1 to Z 4 is impossible in the single-tweakey scenario. X 1 [11] is the only active nibble of X 1 , after a 2-round encryption, all nibbles of Z 2 are active. Z 4 [0, 1, 2] are the only 3 active nibbles of Z 4 , after a 2-round decryption, X 3 only have 12 active nibbles. As Z 2 = X 3 , we get contradictions in 4 nibbles.
In the related-tweakey setting, the differential: (00000000 W 0 [8] W 0 [9]0 W 0 [11]0000) → (000000 X 7 [6] 000000 00 X 7 [15] ) is impossible when the following conditions are satisfied:
1) W 0 [8, 9] = STK 1 [8, 9] ;
2) X 7 [6, 15] = STK 7 [6, 15] ;
3) STK 6 are inactive in all 16 nibbles; 4) Z 4 [3] = 0. Proof: In the forward direction, when condition 1) is satisfied, X 1 [11] will be the only active nibble of X 1 . After a 1-round encryption, the fourth column of W 1 will be active in all 4 nibbles. In the second round, STK 2 [9, 14] are the two active tweakey nibbles, after xoring the internal state difference with STK 2 and the second round function, W 2 will be active in all 12 nibbles in the 1st, 2nd and 4th column.
In the backward direction, when conditions 2) and 3) are satisfied, all internal state nibbles in R5 and R6 are inactive. The difference of W 4 will be imported from STK 5 . Considering condition 4), Z 4 [0, 1, 2] are the only 3 active nibble of Z 4 . After a SR and MC operation, X 4 will be active only in X 4 [0, 5, 10] . Xor X 4 with STK 4 , as the 4th column of W 3 is inactive, after a MC, SR and SB operation, the value of X 3 [1, 6, 11, 12] will be 0. As STK 3 [1, 6, 11, 12] = 0, W 2 [1, 6, 11, 12] will also be 0. So there are contradictions in W 2 [1, 11, 12] when considering both the forward and backward direction, thus when all 4 conditions are satisfied, the differential is impossible.
Note. In fact, the differential before the contradictions can have more possibilities, for example, the active nibble of X 1 can be anyone of the four nibbles of the third column. It's easy to verify that there are still contradictions existing, but the index of contradict nibbles changes, the corresponding active nibbles of W 0 also change, respectively. In total, there are 2 4 × 4 = 2 6 possible related-tweakey impossible differential applicable for the distinguisher. 
B. THE 9-ROUND KEY RECOVERY ATTACK
By adding one round on the top and two rounds on the bottom of the distinguisher in Section IV-A, we mount a 9-round key recovery attack on Joltik-BC-128. The attack differential is shown in Figure 5 . The attack process is as follows: 1) Construct 2 n structures such that each structure is made up of 2 16 plaintexts. In each structure, we set P [15] = STK 0 [15] (a fixed value) and P [2, 7, 8, 13 ] the 4 active bytes 2) Choose (KT , KT ) such that the tweakey difference satisfy the subtweakey difference trail. Encrypt the plaintexts under two tweakeys and only choose the pairs that satisfy Z 8 [1, 2, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15] = MC( C ⊕ STK 9 ) [1, 2, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15] = 0. In total, we will get about 2 n+16×2−4×7 = 2 n+4 pairs. For each of the remaining pairs, do the following steps: 3) As mentioned by the Note in the end of Section IV-A, there are 2 6 possible values of Z 0 [8, 9, 10, 11] . For each possible value of Z 0 [8, 9, 10, 11] , by a SR operation, we can deduce the difference value Y 0 [2, 7, 8, 13] . Considering that we can get the value of X 0 [2, 7, 8, 13] from P and STK 0 (known and fixed), by using Proposition 1, we can deduce the value of X 0 [2, 7, 8, 13] . So we can get 6-bit information of STK 0 [2, 7, 8, 13] as STK 0 [2, 7, 8, 13] = P [2, 7, 8, 13 ] ⊕ X 0 [2, 7, 8, 13] . 4) Guess the value of Z 7 [3, 14] .
We [3, 14] , we can get the value of Y 7 [6, 15] and Z 7 [3, 14] = Y 7 [6, 15] . As Z 7 [3, 14] = MC(X 8 ) [3, 14] ⊕ MC(STK 8 ) [3, 14] . So we also get 8-bit information of STK 8 . 5) We can use as the above steps to filter the wrong key values and then exhaustively search the left key bits.
Complexity Computation:
In total, the number of deduced key nibbles is 4 + 2 + 9 = 15, i.e., 60 bits information of the tweakey. As we guess 2 8 values of Z 7 [3, 14] and there are 2 6 possible values of W 0 [8, 9, 10, 11] , each pair can eliminate 2 14 values of the 60-bit guessed tweakey information. So, to satisfy 2 60 × (1 − 2 14 /2 60 ) 2 n+4 1, we choose n = 48. The memory for storing the key bits is 2 60 60-bit. The data complexity is 2 48+16 = 2 64 plaintexts. The time complexity of step 3 for encrypting the plaintexts is 2 · 2 48+16 = 2 65 . In step 3, the total number of guesses is 2 4+n+14 = 2 66 , which is equivalent to 2 66 · (3/16 + 2/16 + 9/16) · 1/9 · 2 ≈ 2 64.4 9-round encryptions. Thus the time complexity is approximately 2 65.7 9-round encryptions.
C. THE 10-ROUND KEY RECOVERY ATTACK

Distinguisher
We also seek out another distinguisher and based on which we propose a 10-round key recovery attack. The distinguisher is depicted in Figure 6 . The original single-key impossible differential used to derive the related-key one is from X 2 to Z 4 . It's a 2.5-round impossible differential and easy to verify.
By utilizing Proposition 2 and extending rounds both on the top and the bottom of the single-key impossible differential, we get this 6-round related-tweakey impossible distinguisher. The only area of note is that once the MC operation in R4 is a 3-to-2 transformation, so is the MC operation in R0. This is because that W 4 [0, 1] = STK 5 [0, 1] and W 0 [0, 1] = STK 1 [0, 1] and the correlation of STK 1 and STK 5 . So we include Z 0 into the distinguisher. The full derivation process is given in Appendix B.
Attack Process By adding two rounds both on the top and the bottom of the distinguisher, we successfully mount a 10-round key recovery attack on Joltik-BC-128, shown in Figure 7 .
The attack process is as follows: 1) Construct 2 n structures such that each structure is made up of 2 48 plaintexts. In each structure, P[0, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15] are the 12 active bytes. 2) Choose (KT , KT ) such that the tweakey difference satisfy the subtweakey difference trail. Encrypt the plaintexts under two tweakeys and choose the pairs that satisfy MC( C) ⊕ STK 10 [1, 2, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15] = 0. In total, we will get about 2 n+48×2−4×7 = 2 n+68 pairs. For each of the remaining pairs, do the following steps: 3) Guess the value of W 0 [2, 8, 13] . Since STK 1 [8, 15] is known, we get the value of X 1 [2, 8, 13 ].
R. Zong, X. Dong: MILP-Aided Related-Tweak/Key Impossible Differential Attack and Its Applications to QARMA, Joltik-BC From W 1 [8, 9] , after a MC and SR operation, we get the value of Y 1 [2, 8, 13] . [2, 8, 13 ]. 4) To recover the 28-bit of 11-nibble tweakey information of STK 9 and STK 10 , the guessing and deducing process is totally same with Step 4 of the 9-round attack, as the differential of R8 and R9 in Figure 7 is same with the differential of R7 and R8 in Figure 5 Eliminate all wrong tweakey values and exhaustively search the left key bits and recover the whole tweakey.
Complexity Computation:
In total, we can deduce 12 + 3 + 9 + 2 = 26 nibbles, 104 bits information of the tweakey. The memory for storing the key bits is 2 104 bits. As we guess 2 20 values of ( W 0 [2, 8, 13] , Y 8 [14, 7] ), each pair can eliminate 2 20 values of the 104-bit guessed tweakey information. To satisfy 2 104 × (1 − 2 20 /2 104 ) 2 68+n 1, we choose n = 23.
The data complexity is 2 48+23 = 2 71 plaintexts. The time complexity of step 1 for encrypting the plaintexts is 2 · 2 48+23 = 2 72 . The total number of guesses is 2 68+n+20 = 2 111 , which is equivalent to 2 111 · (12/16 + 3/16+2/16+9/16)·1/10·2 ≈ 2 109.5 10-round encryptions. Thus the time complexity is approximately 2 109.5 10-round encryptions.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose a strategy that can derive longer relatedtweak/key impossible differentials from single-key ones. By utilizing the MILP technique, we convert this strategy into three MILP models and propose an automatic tool for searching relate-tweak/key impossible differentials. In fact, we apply this strategy to analyze QARMA-64 and Joltik-BC-128. Actually, this strategy can also be used to more ciphers, for example, Deoxys-BC [21] . The strategy is heavily reliant on the key schedule. And we only apply this strategy to ciphers with linear key schedules. Considering the real-world application needs for lightweight and tweakalbe block ciphers, our strategy can help better cryptanalyze the security of these ciphers.
We welcome other researcher using this method to analyze other ciphers and give improvements.
APPENDIX A SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL OF QARMA-64
A. TRANSITIONS OF THE MC OPERATION For QARMA-64 employing Sbox δ 0 , an example of the actual difference values is shown in Table 4 ; for QARMA-64 employing Sbox δ 1 and δ 2 , the differences can be deduced according to T 10 [4] given in condition (7) of the distinguisher easily. 
B. THE THREE SBOXES
D. ANOTHER DISTINGUISHER AND THE CORRESPONDING 10-ROUND ATTACK APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR JOLTIK-BC-128
Considering the tweakey schedule, TK Then, as W 0 [8, 9] = STK 1 [8, 9] , after a MC operation, as shown in Figure 6 the third column of Z 0 will active only in the first three nibbles.
